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Trade union participation in CSR
deliberation: an evaluation
Geraint Harvey, Andy Hodder and Stephen Brammer
ABSTRACT
Whereas there has been considerable interest in the concept of political corporate
social responsibility (CSR), trade unions have been largely omitted from such
scholarly discussion. This article explores the potential of trade unions as the other
in political CSR and the contribution of trade unions to deliberative democracy with
the ﬁrm. We discuss the importance both of the legitimacy and the efﬁcacy of the
other in political CSR. We proceed to assess trade unions as legitimate and effective
deliberative partners with the ﬁrm towards CSR, evaluating the contribution of trade
unions to deliberative democracy and also the potential outcomes for trade unions in
adopting this role.
1 INTRODUCTION
Holding contemporary corporations to account for their social and environmental
impacts presents increasingly complex problems, as recent examples of corporate
irresponsibility demonstrate (e.g. the Volkswagen emissions scandal, Deep Water
Horizon, Rana Plaza Collapse) (see Treanor, 2015; Barron, 2012; Reinecke and
Donaghey, 2015). The geographic scope, technological uncertainty and multiple
layers of governance associated with many social and environmental issues make
attributing and enforcing accountability extremely challenging (Ramasastry, 2015).
Such challenges present particular problems for government regulatory agencies
whose role in deﬁning and enforcing appropriate business conduct has been fun-
damentally undermined by the growth of global economic transactions that are
often conducted beyond the legislative ambit of the nation state, so that the
nation state ceases to be the ‘legal and moral point of reference’ (Scherer and
Palazzo, 2011: 905). Difﬁculties in regulating responsible conduct are especially
profound in relation to multi-national companies (MNCs), which have been
subject to particular scrutiny in relation to their global social responsibilities
(Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013). In response, there has been an increase in the range
of business and civil-society led approaches towards improving social respon-
sibility including self-regulatory, partnership and collaborative approaches
(Campbell, 2007). The growth of these phenomena raises signiﬁcant questions
regarding the composition, organisation and effectiveness of alternatives to formal
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regulation, and of the potential and limits to such approaches to holding large,
MNCs to account.
The concept of political corporate social responsibility (CSR), developed by
Scherer and Palazzo (2007, 2011), provides a locus for the argument we present in
this article. Political CSR is proposed in response to the view that the nation state
is no longer a sufﬁcient creator and enforcer of the ‘rules of the game’ by which
businesses must play. The MNC ensures that CSR is now a global phenomenon. It
is the MNC that is well placed to contribute to CSR because ‘involvement of private
and public actors may help to better consider the involved interests, to combine the
best available knowledge and resources, and to enhance the capacity to enforce
standards or to implement policies’ (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011: 910). The incorpora-
tion of corporations into the processes through which socially appropriate business
conduct is determined also addresses the difﬁculty of enforcing ‘hard law’, because
MNCs are likely to be inclined to participate in and adhere to outcomes so as to
demonstrate their moral legitimacy in a climate where both cognitive and pragmatic
legitimacy have diminished (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011: 916). Signiﬁcantly, moral
legitimacy is demonstrable in the extent to which decision-making is based on
discourse so that policy is the product of ‘forceless force of the better argument’
(Scherer and Palazzo, 2011: 916).
Central to political CSR is the participation of actors with the capacity and moral
authority to hold business to account in processes of deliberation. While discursive
resources are of primary importance within deliberative processes, there is some
recognition that moral legitimacy might be insufﬁcient to ensure that deliberative out-
comes are held to in practice. For example, in their discussion of the moral legitimacy
of the non-governmental organisation (NGO) as a deliberative partner in political
CSR, Baur and Palazzo (2011: 592) acknowledge that the NGO must occasionally
resort to using ‘more common weapons of the political area if they encounter
unfavourable circumstances such as hostility of powerful actors’. We argue that the
ability to effectively use ‘non-discursive methods’ in the face of resistance from
powerful MNCs (i.e. the efﬁcacy of partners in deliberative processes) does not neces-
sarily undermine the legitimacy of such partners in deliberation. Speciﬁcally, we pro-
pose that political CSR requires of the ﬁrm that it engages in deliberation with both a
legitimate and effective deliberative partner. Therefore, an important contribution of
this article is the distinction that is made between the legitimacy and the efﬁcacy of the
deliberative partner(s) that engage with the ﬁrm in the deliberative processes that
generate political CSR. The process of deliberation between ﬁrm and its deliberative
partners in relation to political CSR provides the point of departure in this article as
we critically evaluate the potential role of trade unions in relation to deliberative
processes that encourage more responsible business conduct.
The role played by trade unions in CSR is an area of study that is underdeveloped,
and whilst there are welcome related contributions, these are largely exploratory and
empirical in character (see Preuss et al., 2015). For example, research concerned with
CSR and unions has explored union and other stakeholder perceptions of how unions
might contribute to CSR (Delbard, 2011), considered the way in which union
involvement has shaped business responses to various issues with mixed results
(Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2006; Fredricksson and Gaston, 1999; Rassier, 2006)
and set out a manifesto for future research on union contributions to CSR (Preuss
et al., 2006; Preuss et al., 2009). A major gap in research on trade unions and CSR
is the absence of nuanced conceptualisations both of the potential for and limitations
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of union involvement in CSR. In response, we conceptualise the potential role of
unions in CSR through the lens of deliberative democracy.
2 DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AS A FOUNDATION FOR POLITICAL
CSR
For some time now, scholars have questioned the appetite, if not the ability, of certain
countries to ‘tame the activities of MNCs’, for example, through the introduction of
‘legal measures that may inhibit corporate investment or may cause MNCs to relo-
cate to more hospitable countries’ (Shamir, 2004: 637; see also Graham and Woods,
2006). Moreover, scholars have pointed to the inadequacy of national institutions and
regulations to deal with the scale and growth of cross-border economic transaction
and movement leading to ‘governance gaps’ (Marginson, 2016: 1035; see also,
Voegtlin and Pless, 2014). In sum, the ‘law and the state apparatus are insufﬁcient
means for the integration of business activities with societal concerns’ (Scherer and
Palazzo, 2007: 1101) and that ‘neither nation-states nor international institutions
alone are able to sufﬁciently regulate the global economy and to provide global public
goods’ (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011: 900).
Consequently, new institutional, multilevel, arrangements have emerged and
operate concomitantly with established institutions (Marginson, 2016). For instance,
ﬁrms are contributing to and operating in accordance with civil regulation or ‘private,
non-state, or market-based regulatory frameworks’ (Vogel, 2007: 5) in order to ‘com-
pensate for some of the shortcomings of national and international state governance’
(Vogel, 2007: 4). Whereas civil regulation usually involves non-business constituents,
and speciﬁc standards are introduced in response to pressure from an external source
such as consumer sanction, civil regulation is invariably inﬂuenced by the motives of
senior management ‘whose stakes may be ethically questionable’ (Scherer and
Palazzo, 2007: 1099). In response to this, Scherer and Palazzo propose deliberative
democracy, whereby ‘the legitimacy of a political decision rests on the discursive
quality of the decision making’ (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007: 1107) so that legitimate
decision-making is based on discussion with collective associations such as NGOs.
In the absence of sufﬁcient national and international legislation, political CSR argu-
ably ensures a check on the interests of the ﬁrm whose agents must justify its policies
in the course of deliberation with deliberative partners or else change them. The
democratic credentials of particular deliberative partners are of paramount import,
and therefore, legitimacy emerges as a ﬁrst criterion for the assessment of the norma-
tive appropriateness of possible deliberative partners within deliberative democracy.
Deliberation should be rational and free from the inﬂuence of force or coercion and
the outcome determined by reason and the power of the better argument. In principle,
coercion is anathema to deliberative democracy, which is based on the ‘uncoercive
force of reason’ (Ott, 2012: 578). However, that reason determines the outcome of dis-
cussion is compatible with the use of coercion post deliberation in order to ensure that
the outcome of deliberation is manifest in policy decisions. Indeed, this may be neces-
sary where there is an asymmetry of power between the parties in deliberation and
where the outcome of deliberation contradicts the interests of the more powerful
group. Therefore, partners in deliberative processes must also be effective in ensuring
that the outcomes of the deliberative process are realised.
In the absence of efﬁcacy to ensure adherence to the outcome of deliberation, there
is the possibility, if not probability, that policy decisions are nonetheless based on
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speciﬁc interests (of the powerful). Political CSR pits the might of the MNC
(themselves ‘disturbingly powerful lobbies’, Crouch, 2009: 52), against others in the
global economy where the former ‘occupy a more directly regulatory role’ (Crouch,
2009: 50). Coercion as a means of imposing one’s will is clearly at odds with
deliberative democracy; however, post hoc coercion so that the outcomes of
deliberation are reﬂected in policy is critical to political CSR. It is therefore important
that deliberative partners involved in political CSR can exert pressure on the MNC
independently of the formal regulatory system so that the policy outcomes of
deliberation better reﬂect the process of deliberation. The next section evaluates the
trade union according to the criteria of suitability for participation in political CSR.
3 CSR DELIBERATION: LEGITIMACY, EFFICACY AND THE TRADE
UNION
The argument that trade unions are important stakeholders in the CSR and ethical
strategies of the ﬁrm has been made elsewhere (see for example Brammer et al.,
2012; Campbell, 2007; Rhodes and Harvey, 2012; Yu, 2009). It is important at this
stage to deﬁne what we mean by the trade union. After all, there is considerable
and persistent diversity: in the nature of trade unionism both internationally and
intra-nationally (see, for example, Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013); in
different strategies towards management, for instance militancy or moderation
(Kelly, 1996); and indeed in approaches towards members, as encapsulated in the
servicing and organising debate (Heery, 2002: 27).
It is worthwhile to provide a preliminary contrast of the position of trade unions
vis-à-vis other actors with a stake in ﬁrms’ CSR practices. Existing research tends
to juxtapose ‘internal’ (‘primary’ or ‘normative’) stakeholders such as employees, cus-
tomers and investors with ‘external’ (‘secondary’ or ‘derivative’) stakeholders such as
community groups, NGOs and the media (Laplume et al., 2008). Internal and exter-
nal stakeholders differ in important respects in the extent and speciﬁcity of the re-
sources they have contributed to the ﬁrm, the extent to which they have assets at
risk in the ﬁrm, and thus the legitimacy of their interest in the direction of the business
(Phillips, 2003). Trade unions occupy a distinctive position in this landscape of stake-
holders in that they are at once and the same time internal stakeholders (a signiﬁcant
stake in the success, continuity and growth of businesses, formalised channels of voice
and interaction) and external stakeholders (formal/structural independence from the
ﬁrm, contrasting interests with the ﬁrm in some areas, somewhat narrower
issue/advocacy interests). As CSR involves navigating a balance between various
forms and domains of responsibility (Schwartz and Carroll, 2003), we argue that
trade unions are well placed to encourage pro-social business conduct that is mindful
of economic imperatives for business success as well as avoiding the excesses of some
extreme single-issue activists. Given the myriad differences between unions, our
analysis is largely based on a normative account of the trade union and focus on
the unifying themes of trade unionism, that trade unions are independent from the
ﬁrm, principally motivated to represent workers’ interests and committed to
democratic internal processes (see Hodder and Edwards, 2015).
3.1 Legitimacy of the trade union
The legitimacy of the partner in the deliberative process is of paramount importance
both in general and speciﬁcally in relation to establishing norms of conduct in respect
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of social and environmental issues. Legitimacy is in large part a matter of perspective
(Chaison and Bigelow, 2002; Dussel, 2013; see also Koch, 2015: 13). Widespread
absence of trade union recognition and employer hostility towards trade unions (see
Cullinane and Dundon, 2013) demonstrate the perspective of corporations towards
trade union legitimacy, while the Trade Union Act (2016) exempliﬁes the perspective
of the current Conservative government in the UK. However, our concern here is not
to consider the legitimacy of the trade union per se, but the legitimacy of the trade
union to be involved in deliberation over CSR. As such, we consider the democratic
nature of trade unionism, the broader social contribution made by the trade union
and the presence of incentive alignment that illustrate the positive role that unions
might play in relation to CSR.
Trade unions are democratic organisations whereby the will of the membership is
expressed through ballot on all issues such as the representatives and leadership.
Criticism of trade union susceptibility to the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ has been refuted
theoretically (Gouldner, 1964; Kelly and Heery, 1994), while the ‘iron law of democ-
racy’ has been demonstrated by trade unions in the UK (Evans et al., 2012). Trade
unions are both democratic agents and agents of democracy (see Erman, 2013) in that
they provide a countervailing force to absolutism in industry, which can lead ‘to a
number of pernicious and socially injurious outcomes’ (Kaufman, 2000: 189). Or as
Erne puts it, trade unions ‘also consolidate political democracy by holding corpora-
tions accountable when they subject citizens, as they frequently do, to autocratic rule
in the production process or colonize the democratic process by pecuniary means’
(Erne, 2008: 1).
It has been argued that although well placed to represent their members, trade
unions are not legitimate representatives of the interests of people beyond the ﬁrm.
In other words, there is a basis for the ‘validity of [trade union] voice on issues affect-
ing their members—but not other issues’ (Bendell, 2006: 38). However, unions are
also responsive to broader social concerns (see Hyman, 2001). For example, trade
unions in the UK have worked closely with Amnesty International since the late
1970s not only collaborating on campaigns concerning persecuted trade unionists,
but also in support of broader social issues such as child labour (Myrstad, 1999),
Chinese democracy in the 1990s, and human rights in Columbia and other countries
(see Heery, 2009: 32–33). More recently, trade unions have been integral to the Living
Wage campaign in the UK—the impact of which extends beyond the conﬁnes of trade
union membership (see Heery et al., 2015: 21).
We also point to the incentive alignment between ﬁrm and trade union in CSR
deliberation. It is perhaps understandable that CSR is less likely where ﬁrms are
experiencing poor ﬁnancial performance and where the prospect of ‘near-term
proﬁtability is limited’ (Campbell, 2007: 952). Indeed, it might be argued that
adherence to CSR objectives in such an environment would ultimately lead to socially
undesirable consequences, for example, cessation of operations resulting in
unemployment. Moreover, governmental appetite for CSR legislation is inhibited
during economic crises because of any detrimental impact on economic recovery
and the ability of the ﬁrm to compete. There may be reticence and indeed resistance
to enacting legislation that imposes strictures on ﬁrms.
Negotiation with a trade union, on the other hand, permits ﬂexibility in response to
societal demands. The trade union as steward of CSR continues to press the ﬁrm
towards social and public goods, but is also well placed to understand the
idiosyncratic [ﬁnancial] pressures faced by the ﬁrm on occasion and to permit the
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temporary redirection of capital, which might include investment in CSR, in order to
ensure the survival of the ﬁrm (arguably, a high ranking public good in terms of those
employed within the ﬁrm). Ultimately then, the trade union can ensure that whereas
the duration of the journey towards CSR may be longer and the direction of travel
circuitous, the destination (CSR) does not change.
3.2 Effectiveness of the trade union
Whilst we have established that the trade union is independent from the ﬁrm, it is also
internal to it. After all, union members, where such exist, comprise a proportion of
the workforce that participates in and contributes to the performance of the ﬁrm.
Therefore, in terms of CSR, the efﬁcacy of the trade union can be expressed both
within the ﬁrm (internally) and beyond the ﬁrm (externally) and understood
according to two dimensions: communication and mobilisation (see Figure 1). An
example of internal communication is the channelling of CSR information between
management and the employee, raising concerns expressed by employees to manage-
ment for consideration and conveying managerial response and strategic decisions to
employees. In this regard, the trade union can be seen by management as ‘more of a
lubricant than an irritant’ (McCarthy and Parker, 1968: 56). Collective voice is
critical to the success of the ﬁrm for two very good reasons: ﬁrst, that effective voice
leads to participation and a beneﬁcial impact on quality and productivity, and
second, that it highlights problems that might otherwise fester or ‘explode’ if
unaddressed (Dundon et al., 2004: 1151). The trade union is already well situated
to engage in deliberation given that its primary function is to negotiate with manage-
ment on behalf of its members. As an internal voice mechanism, the trade union not
Figure 1: Dimensions of trade union voice efﬁcacy
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only deliberates over CSR policy with senior management, but offers an effective
conduit within the ﬁrm between the employees and management via which employees
can raise ethical concerns without fear of reprisal, ‘providing a safe route for workers
to report non-compliance’ (Ethical Trading Initiative, 2010: 1), that might otherwise
not result from individual/direct communication.
The trade union is distinct from the ﬁrm and unencumbered by the organisational
constraints to which the HR function is beholden (see Collings and Wood, 2009: 5;
Rhodes and Harvey, 2012; Purcell and Ahlstrand, 1994). Nevertheless, it is sufﬁ-
ciently engaged to observe the activities of the ﬁrm and to act proactively to inﬂuence
decision making, challenging the prerogative of the agents of capital through
collective voice, thereby potentially achieving ‘what the lone voice could never do’
(Prosser, 2001, cited in Dundon et al., 2004: 1151). To be clear, the trade union is
well placed to monitor and respond to activities that contradict agreements reached
through deliberative process, but also to challenge activities undertaken by the ﬁrm
that have not featured for discussion during this process but which are socially irre-
sponsible. We elaborate on this point by adapting Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu’s
(2002) framework for civil society engagement with environmental governance.
Through its involvement in the ﬁrm, the trade union has access to information that
it is able to collate, analyse and subsequently present to management, its members
and stakeholders outside of the ﬁrm. It is able to advocate for justice in the work-
place and beyond, and inﬂuence ﬁrm policy towards this end. A broadly similar
point is made by Dicken (2009: 6) of trade unions as ‘effective positive mediators’
of regulation within the workplace. In so doing, the trade union is able to mitigate
against negative employee attribution by acting as an effective and reliable source
of communication of the purpose of CSR, thereby avoiding the problems created
by ineffectual communication (Du et al., 2010). Thereafter, it is able to closely
monitor ﬁrm compliance with the CSR objectives set in a way that a wholly external
organisation cannot.
Unlike external organisations, the trade union is omnipresent through its members
and therefore positioned to observe and announce instances of ‘greenwashing’ or
‘corporate citizenship façade’ in order to oppose resolute miscreant managerial intent.
The ability of any independent organisation to monitor the performance of the ﬁrm is
questionable. Royle (2010: 16) refers to this as the ‘spotlight phenomenon’ and
exposes the problems of such monitoring as both ‘roving and random’ (Royle
(2010: 16); 18) as when one organisation is under the ‘spotlight’, another may be free
to behave as it wishes. In contrast, trade unions are well placed to identify
non-compliance, ‘coordinating workers to monitor workplace practices’ (Ethical
Trading Initiative, 2010: 1).
If communication is insufﬁcient in challenging corporate malfeasance, then the
trade union is able to resort to internal or external mobilisation of stakeholder
support. For example, in articulating the particular ‘injustice’ as a means of inspiring
collective action (see Kelly, 1998: 27), the trade union is able to mobilise the member-
ship to impose sanctions on the ﬁrm. It is very difﬁcult for senior management to
‘legitimate their actions’ according to rules (of law) or employee complicity (as wage
taking participants) and yet more so in relation to beliefs about fairness (Kelly, 1998)
when activity fundamentally contravenes the most rudimentary shared notions of
fairness. If it is unable to prevent miscreancy on the part of the ﬁrm through internal
mobilisation, then the trade union might exert its political inﬂuence (external
mobilisation) by drawing attention to geographically speciﬁc instances of corporate
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malfeasance to which the MNC is more susceptible (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011).
Externally, the trade union can communicate with the wider polity (Erne, 2008), dis-
seminating ﬁndings of its continuous monitoring of the ﬁrm so as to prevent instances
of ‘greenwashing’. Where the trade union is unable to constrain managerial preroga-
tive that might result in societal harm, it has the potential to mobilise political action.
A ﬁnal point to be made here is that the trade union is well placed to strive against
and respond to ‘unintended effects’ (Edwards, 2015a) of action taken, such as cam-
paigns by the NGO and consumer sanction such as buy-cotts. Neither of these actors
is embedded within the ﬁrm, and neither is especially well suited to inﬂuence the form
that the corporate response takes. In contrast, through its representatives and in nego-
tiation with management, the trade union may moderate the impact of the corporate
response on the most vulnerable, for example, by engaging in concession bargaining.
4 CSR DELIBERATION: DEFICIT OF AND DOWNSIDES FOR THE TRADE
UNION
We argue above that the trade union represents a legitimate partner in deliberation
with the ﬁrm towards CSR because it offers the opportunity for inclusion and partic-
ipation to its members, whose interests represent those of wider society as the mem-
bers comprise in part the demos. That said, there may be a stark contrast between
the interests of people as workers and as citizens and that ‘these terrains of interest
may be in tension with each other’ (Edwards, 2015b: 179). Put another way, ‘moral
judgements are always understood and expressed in a relativistic manner’ (Lukes,
2008: 25). Consequently, the trade union representing worker interests may have to
work with employers (and their CSR practices) in sectors including tobacco (Fooks
et al., 2011), tourism (Camilleri, 2014), arms (Cole, 1923; Donnelly and Scholarios,
1998), nuclear power (Räthzel and Uzzell, 2011) and the extractive industries (Mutti
et al., 2012). In such sectors, there is arguably limited alignment between the interests
of the worker, as represented by their trade union, and wider society (see Vachon and
Brecher, 2016). As these sectors are associated with signiﬁcant wider social and
environmental externalities, this perhaps suggests a boundary condition to the
capacity of unions to promote beneﬁcial wider social and environmental outcomes.
However, that an industry has such externalities does not preclude it from
contributing in socially responsible ways that do not run contrary to the purpose of
the ﬁrm. Trade unions representing workers in tobacco ﬁrms, for example, might
press the ﬁrm for social responsibility in climate change or child poverty.
It has been suggested that the members of trade unions are primarily of a particular
type, far from the cosmopolitan blend of the societies in which they are based, that is,
‘pale, male and stale’ (Simms et al., 2013; 20). For some time now, scholarship has
pointed to the failure of trade unions to attract younger workers (Hodder, 2014),
and unions are still struggling to comprehensively engage with an ever increasing
number of precarious workers (Heery and Abbott, 2000; Standing, 2011). Neverthe-
less, there is certainly evidence that trade unions are pursuing a strategy towards
broadening their remit in order to encourage diversity in membership and achieving
aims and objectives that have a broader societal impact (Frege and Kelly, 2004).
Take, for instance, recent union strategies of engaging with local interest groups to-
wards achieving societal goals at a macro level (and also to increase union member-
ship), commonly referred to as community unionism (McBride and Greenwood,
2009), or, as stated above, trade union engagement with global pressure groups
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(e.g., social movement unionism) to achieve the same ends, albeit at a macro level
(Robinson, 2000; Heery, 2009).
As for efﬁcacy, the decline in trade union membership across the globe (Visser,
2006) undermines the argument that trade unions are able to coerce management to
accept the outcomes of deliberation in their CSR policies. Certainly, this trend indi-
cates a diminution in the associational power of the trade union (Wright, 2000) and
its ability to coerce management through traditional industrial relations channels.
We now turn our attention to the important question of whether engagement in
CSR deliberation is appropriate for organised labour. We do this by (i) brieﬂy
exploring whether involvement in CSR deliberation is consistent with the economic
objective of organised labour and (ii) considering the possible implications of trade
union involvement in CSR, namely in terms of members’ reactions.
For instance, it has been argued that unions exist ‘not to provide workers with an
exercise in self-government’ (Allen, 1954: 15) but ‘for the purpose of protecting and
advancing the members’ economic interests in connection with their daily work’
(Cole, 1952: 13), ‘regardless in general of political and social considerations, except
in so far as these bear directly upon its own economic ends’ (Hoxie, 1923: 45). Subse-
quently, one might question whether the trade union is able to accommodate this
economic function whilst concurrently applying pressure on the ﬁrm to provide social
goods beyond those that beneﬁt the membership.
Research has shown that the trade union can be effective in the representation of its
membership and also in exerting ‘a major egalitarian inﬂuence on the British labour
market’ (Metcalf et al., 2001: 74), thereby meeting the duality of what Flanders
(1970: 15) identiﬁes as representing ‘vested interests’ and acting as a ‘sword of justice’,
albeit in a narrow sense with regards to the latter. Engagement in CSR requires a
broader remit of the trade union than the national labour market, that is, the nature
and extent of injustice with which it must concern itself is much greater. Conse-
quently, in endeavouring to meet the new demands incumbent upon it, the trade
union may be less able to represent the interests of its members. For instance, CSR
in relation to climate change—‘a problem of production and consumption’ (Ajl,
2009)—presents a conundrum as it juxtaposes the trade union’s objectives of achiev-
ing vested interests, that is, increasing production and labour, with its commitment to
the environment, resulting in the very opposite. More generally, resources are ﬁnite,
and it is not hard to conceive of a situation wherein management presents the trade
union with a zero sum game whereby ﬁnancial commitment to CSR or ﬁnancial
commitment to the workforce are offered as alternatives.
In extremis, two outcomes are possible. First, there is the possibility that involve-
ment in CSR deliberation might precipitate a decline in membership due to disaffec-
tion by the move away from its traditional function of representing the interest of
members towards a stewardship of societal interests. Given the decline in trade union
density across the globe, involvement in CSR deliberation is then potentially damag-
ing to the labour movement. In contrast to this ominous perspective, there are
grounds for optimism for involvement in CSR deliberation to revitalise trade union
membership if the new ‘collective action frame’ (Gahan and Pakarek, 2013) has
greater resonance with the views of individuals formerly either indifferent to, or
antagonistic towards, trade unions. Such a reframing of trade unionism opens the
door to opportunity as well as threat, by demonstrating the relevance of trade
unionism to those who might otherwise feel that trade unions are irrelevant for them
(see, for example, Heery and Conley, 2007: 13).
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A second point is whether a wider role for unions in promoting CSR is more appro-
priate for certain trade unions than for others (inter-union suitability), or whether it is
more appropriate for certain distinct occupational groups within trade unions than
for other union members (intra-union suitability). If indeed it is the case that certain
unions or certain occupational groups ﬁt the role better than others, then any involve-
ment in CSR becomes highly divisive and problematic at a macro level and thus the
implications for the labour movement more generally require careful consideration.
Moreover, trade unions are more likely to participate in CSR where there is legislative
underpinning for trade union involvement, as in coordinated market economies
(CME) (Preuss et al., 2006). Therefore, the trade union that pursues this strategy in
a liberal market economy, without the legislative support found in CMEs and without
understanding the effect of such a strategy on membership density does so at a
considerable risk.
5 CONCLUSION
This article responds to the burgeoning debate on political CSR that advocates for
the MNC to play a more active and political role in CSR due to the limitations of
legislation to constrain the behaviours of ﬁrms operating beyond the domestic
context. At the heart of political CSR is a deliberative democratic process between
the ﬁrm and broader stakeholder groups in order to determine CSR based on reason-
able and logical discussion. This article makes several contributions to this debate by
integrating the ﬂedging study of trade union involvement in CSR. First, we use the
political CSR debate to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the role
of trade unions in CSR and document the legitimacy of the trade union to partner
the ﬁrm in deliberative democracy towards CSR. Whereas the focus of scholarship
has been on the legitimacy of the partner in deliberative processes, we highlight that
because of inevitable asymmetries in power in these relationships, that is, dominance
of the MNC, the efﬁcacy of deliberative partners is critical ensuring that the out-
comes of deliberation are realised in policy and practice. We establish the legitimacy
of the trade union in deliberation with the ﬁrm according to the democratic nature of
trade unionism (both an agent of democracy and a democratic agent), the
embeddedness of unions within institutionalised voice channels and the presence of
incentive alignment contribute considerably to the positive role that unions might
play in relation to CSR. Moreover, a second contribution made in the article is in
its discussion of the importance of efﬁcacy in deliberative democracy. We argue that
the partner to the ﬁrm must not only be legitimate in order to represents the interests
of the demos that often contradict those of the ﬁrm, but also effective in ensuring
that the outcomes of deliberation are manifest in policy. Simply put, for this kind
of deliberation to work, even within ﬁrms with the most sincere and enlightened
management, there must be a powerful incentive for the ﬁrm to commit to a course
of action that goes beyond a sense of moral obligation and is potentially antithetical
to the traditional (or neo classical) purpose of the capitalist organisation. To be sure,
any partner with which the ﬁrm engages in deliberation must have both a perspective
that is contrasting with and independent of that of management (in order to arrive at
action that reﬂects the views of stakeholders other than senior management), but also
be effective in monitoring compliance with agreed initiatives and be capable of
taking effective action in the event of noncompliance. The efﬁcacy of the trade union
is presented herein as the ability to communicate with and mobilise stakeholders
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both within and beyond the ﬁrm. Finally, the article analyses the potential and
pitfalls of trade union participation in CSR deliberation. Disaffection with this
revised strategy among members of trade unions might be damaging to the labour
movement. The uncertainty over member reaction to this new role for their
representations ensures that adoption of such a strategy is something of a gamble.
Nevertheless, by wielding the ‘sword of justice’, trade union involvement in political
CSR has the potential to attract members who would otherwise eschew trade union
membership.
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